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1. Introduction
Wage rigidity has been a recurrent theme among economists during the twentieth
century. An interesting episode is the inter-war years, when Britain’s labor market was in
a depressed state. Despite high unemployment and a tight monetary policy to reduce
prices, nominal wages were slow to fall. In the Committee of Economists,
1 appointed by
the government in 1930, Lionel Robbins argued that unions, unemployment insurance,
and certain restrictive practices had an important role in generating wage rigidity and
persistent unemployment. Arthur Pigou suggested that a main problem lay in a
geographical mismatch between jobs and job-seekers, aggravated by unemployment
insurance. The chairman, John Maynard Keynes, took the position that wage rigidity was
a social fact of life, related to workers’ concerns about justice and relative income, that
institutional reform could do little about.
Seventy years later economists still argue about wage rigidity. Although we today
are equipped with numerous theories and econometric studies dealing with issues of
wage setting and unemployment, there is still not much consensus on the substantive
mechanisms. In search for more evidence, some economists have recently embarked on
an unorthodox research program, which attempts to discriminate between theories of
wage rigidity by asking questions to the people that actually is involved in setting wages,
and designing firms’ personnel policy. Though these field surveys provide many useful
insights,
2 they have been conducted under fairly stable macroeconomic conditions, and
                                                       
1 For an account of the views among the members of the Committee of economists, see Moggridge
(1992, Chapter 19). For a general discussion about wage rigidity during these years, see Hicks (1974).
2 This small but expanding literature includes the works of Kaufman (1984), Blinder and Choi (1990),
Agell and Lundborg (1995), Bewley (1995,1998), and Campbell and Kamlani (1997). Kaufman (1984)
interviewed a small sample of managers in non-unionized firms in Greater London, Wales, and the West
Midlands. Blinder and Choi (1990) approached 19 firms in New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania. Agell
and Lundborg (1995) interviewed compensation executives and managers in 179 firms in Swedish2
aimed at a single cross-section of firms. As a consequence, they provide little information
about the anatomy of wage rigidity during a severe and prolonged recession.
To overcome this limitation this paper reports the results from a repeat survey of
wage setting and other work practices in 157 firms in Swedish manufacturing, carried
out in two years (1991 and 1998) of highly different macroeconomic conditions. As our
second survey was preceded by an extended period of high unemployment, and very low
inflation, we are provided with a unique opportunity to explore how persistent labor
market slack and a move from high to low inflation affect the nature of wage rigidity.
Has high unemployment made employees and local unions more willing to relax their
wage claims? Is Tobin (1972) right in speculating that the labor market functions less
well when inflation is very low, since downward money wage rigidity then prevents real
wages to fall in times of slack capacity?
Moreover, by comparing our results for the unionized and regulated Swedish
labor market to those obtained in surveys among US managers we can assess the role of
country specific mechanisms in generating wage rigidity and unemployment persistence.
The preliminary results of Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) suggest that the interaction
between aggregate shocks and labor market institutions holds promise in explaining high
and persistent unemployment in Europe. They report indications that, because of job
security legislation and generous unemployment benefits, employment in the average
European economy takes a longer time to bounce back after a negative macroeconomic
shock. Our microeconomic evidence, gathered during the Swedish macroeconomic crisis
of the 1990s, provides an interesting possibility to shed further light on the issue.
                                                                                                                                                                  
manufacturing. Bewley (1995,1998) interviewed managers and labor leaders in 258 firms in
Connecticut. The sample of Campbell and Kamlani (1997) consists of 184 firms, most of which belong
to Business Week 1000 corporations.3
We find no evidence that high and persistent unemployment has softened the
mechanisms generating wage rigidity. We document the near-absence of nominal wage
cuts during a prolonged period characterized by very high unemployment and low
inflation. We trace this pervasive nominal wage rigidity to the compound influences from
various legal provisions of the wage contract, and from employees’ concerns about
relative income and fairness. We also conjecture, based on indirect evidence, that wage
rigidity is aggravated by certain aspects of the safety net provided by the Swedish
welfare state. The apparently quite solid nature of the nominal wage floor seems to
suggest – in line with Tobin’s argument – that Sweden’s move to a low inflation
environment has been accompanied by increased rigidity of real wages.
We also discuss several other pieces of information. We report substantial
evidence that unemployment raises effort and weeds out substandard performance, as
predicted by efficiency wage theory. In addition, we were surprised to learn that so many
managers appear to ascribe such an important motivational role to (non-economic)
psychological and sociological factors. We examine to what extent employers view job-
seekers with an history of long-term unemployment as potentially less productive, and
conclude that many managers view people with an unemployment record as less
productive. Finally, and in accordance with the macroeconomic evidence of Blanchard
and Wolfers (1999), our respondents point at the stringent Swedish job security
legislation as an important reason for the weak recovery of labor demand after the initial
macroeconomic bust.4
2. Macroeconomic environment, sample and survey design
When we conducted our first survey in the fall of 1991, the Swedish economy was
headed for the most severe economic downturn since the early 1930s. Throughout the
postwar period, between 1945 and 1990, unemployment never exceeded 4 percent.
Between 1991 and 1993 GDP fell by more than five percent, and total unemployment
(including those enrolled in labor market programs) increased from almost 4 percent to
more than 12 percent of the work force.
3 The rate of job destruction was particularly
pronounced in manufacturing; between 1990 and 1993 the number of employees in
manufacturing decreased by 22 percent. Inflation decelerated from above 10 percent in
1991, down to almost 4 percent in 1993, reaching zero in 1996. By the time we re-
interviewed our firms in the fall of 1998 inflation was still very close to zero. But
unemployment remained high – more than 10 percent of the workforce was still either
unemployed, or enrolled in a labor market program.
In our 1991 survey 179 firms participated, and when we updated our address
register in 1998, it turned out that nine of these had closed down operation.
4 The
remaining 170 firms constitute the population for our repeat-survey. After three written
reminders (that contained copies of the questionnaire), and a final reminder on phone, we
obtained responses from 157 firms, which implies a very high response rate of 92.3
                                                       
3 For a discussion of the origin and nature of the Swedish economic crisis of the 1990s, see Calmfors
(1993).
4 We based our original 1991 sample on an address register compiled by the Swedish Association of
Industries, designed to provide a balanced coverage of the manufacturing industry. In 1991 the register
included 300 firms, employing approximately 40 percent of all employees in Swedish manufacturing. Of
these firms, 179 responded to our first survey, implying a response rate of 59.7 percent. This sample is
dominated by large firms; in 1991 the average number of employees was 1 154. It is also heavily
dominated by machinery and equipment, which is not surprising, given this sector’s traditional role in
Swedish manufacturing. The average unionization rate is 92 percent, and the average share of white
collar workers is 35.7 percent. For more detail on survey and sample design, see Agell and Lundborg
(1993, 1995).5
percent. Below, when we make comparisons across surveys, we will confine attention to
this balanced sample, where we have two observations for each firm.
5
In designing the new questionnaire, an overriding objective was to obtain
comparability over time. In most instances, we simply re-cycled the old questions. We
maintained the standard of requiring respondents to indicate the likelihood or frequency
of various events on an integer scale from 1 to 9, with 1 indicating that a certain event is
most unlikely, and 9 that it is very likely. We also maintained some questions of an open-
ended nature, asking respondents to provide a short answer in their own words. In other
instances, we made some slight changes in the original phrasing of the questions, either
because factual developments made modifications necessary, or because we judged the
old phrasing to be somewhat clumsy.
6 Both in 1991 and 1998 the field-work was
conducted in November and December.
3. Stylized facts on wage cuts and underbidding
In 1991 we did not find it worthwhile to ask firms whether they had experienced
episodes when money wages had been cut. Because Swedish unemployment used to be
very low, and inflation quite high, and because of the collective nature of Swedish wage
bargaining institutions, we considered nominal wage cuts as a theoretical peculiarity, of
little practical relevance. However, in 1998 we were curious to see whether the new
                                                       
5 As an illustration of the extent of job destruction that occurred during the crisis, many firms reported
that they had reduced their work-force in a very substantial manner since 1990. Sixteen firms (10.4
percent) answered that they had reduced employment by more than 50 percent, while another 41 firms
(26.6 percent) had reduced employment with up to 50 percent.6
situation of high unemployment, and zero inflation, had created an environment that was
more conducive to wage cuts. Specifically, we asked firms whether they at any time
during the 1990s, covering a period of 6-7 years of very low inflation and high
unemployment, had reduced nominal wages.
Out of 153 responding firms, only two had experienced money wage cuts. For
those two firms the wage cuts can hardly be classified as very extensive (the following
information was obtained in phone conversations). In one firm, with several hundred
employees, two office clerks got reduced pay as they were re-assigned to less qualified
duties. As part of a general revision of its pay system, the other firm (a window-
manufacturer in southern Sweden) re-negotiated and lowered the piece rates for a
handful of its employees. In our view, the almost virtual absence of nominal wage cuts
among firms that had a total of 187 000 employees in 1991, is prima facie evidence that
it may take more than several years of very high unemployment and very low inflation to
create a hole in the Keynesian wage floor. Below, we will analyze the reasons for this
deeply rooted nominal wage rigidity in some detail.
7
An elementary insight is that unemployment would not arise if unemployed
workers would underbid the employed ones, and if firms would hire the underbidders.
According to Solow (1990, p .38), however, the absence of underbidding and active
wage competition is a key stylized fact that ought to be accounted for in models of
unemployment. In 1991 and 1998 we asked firms the following:
                                                                                                                                                                  
6 As we judged it instrumental to obtain a high response rate we went to great length to design the new
questionnaire in a way that made it easy to respond to. The second survey is more limited in scope than
the first one, and it contains less information about background variables. For example, we removed a
number of questions about employment structure, unionization patterns, and pay systems.
7 For a comparison with the USA, one may note that Blinder and Choi (1990, p. 1005) report that five of
their 19 firms recently had cut wages. However, when interviewing 409 employed persons in the7
Does your firm presently have external job applicants who offer to work for less
than the going wage for employees with the same qualifications and experience?
(The question should be answered even if your firm presently has no vacancies
and if local union or collective bargaining contracts prevent these people from
being hired.)
In 1991 we found, in contradiction of Solow’s conjecture, that underbidding was not all
that uncommon. Ten percent of firms replied that they presently encountered
underbidding blue-collar workers, and 13.6 percent did the same for white-collar
workers. We also asked about underbidding in the past, and found a similar pattern. In
1991 43.5 percent had previously encountered underbidding blue-collar workers, and
52.3 percent had encountered underbidding white-collar workers. However, as predicted
by standard efficiency wage theory, firms always or nearly always rejected underbidders.
8
Managers responded that hiring underbidders would violate their internal wage policy,
and that they considered underbidders to have inferior skills.
In 1998 we expected to find that underbidding had got more common. However,
we found the precise opposite – in spite of much higher unemployment, wage
competition had got much less common. Only three percent of firms reported that they
presently encountered underbidding blue-collar workers, and 5.2 percent reported
underbidding white-collar workers. We also asked about underbidding in the past, during
the crisis of the 1990s, and found that the percentages had dropped significantly to 25.7
and 28.4, respectively.
                                                                                                                                                                  
Washington DC area in 1995, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) report that only seven had experienced
wage cuts during the previous year.
8 Similarly, Bewley (1995) reports US evidence that underbidding does occur, but that firms do not
appear to exploit the situation. For experimental results on underbidding, see Fehr and Falk (1999).8
It is easy to think of reasons why wage competition ought to be uncommon in a
welfare state. Due to unemployment benefits and income dependent taxes and transfers,
many unemployed Swedes gain relatively little from acquiring a job. This explains why an
adverse unemployment shock is unlikely to lead to very intensified wage competition in a
welfare state. It may also explain why underbidding appears to be more frequent among
white collar workers than among blue collar workers, as white collar workers typically
have lower compensation rates when unemployed.
9 But it does not explain why
underbidding got less intense between 1991-98. To explain the reduced intensity of wage
competition, we are left with the simple conjecture that the circumstances of a severe
macroeconomic shock discourage active job search. During (and shortly after) a period
when firms reduce their workforce substantially, applying for a new job might not appear
to be a worthwhile activity.
10
4. Job security and managers’ perceptions of firing costs
After the immediate crisis in 1991-93 manufacturing recovered strongly. Between 1993
to 1998 production grew, spurred by a huge depreciation of the Krona in 1992, at an
annual rate of nine percent. But at the same time the number of manufacturing employees
grew at an annual rate of only one percent. Can this period of “jobless growth” be due to
                                                       
9 See e.g. the micro-simulations reported by The Expert Group on Public Finance (1998). In these
simulations, based on the tax and benefit provisions applying in 1998, the unemployed are given their
former wage, or in some cases an estimated wage, and then all taxes, housing allowances, social
assistance, and child care fees are recalculated. The results indicate that 4 percent of the unemployed
would gain nothing from acquiring employment, that 38 percent have a disposable income that is
between 90-99 percent of income if employed, and that 36 percent have a disposable income that is
between 80-89 percent of income if employed.
10 In this context it is important to note that Swedish labor market legislation requires a firm to recall
laid-off workers before it can have a pick among other job-seekers.9
the provisions of Swedish job security legislation? Recent theoretical research, supported
by cross-country regressions, suggests that employment protection may have an
important effect on employment dynamics.
11 By reducing hirings during an upswing and
firings during a downturn, job security lowers the variance of employment over the
business cycle.
We confronted managers with statements about job security designed to capture
mechanisms emphasized in the literature.
12 In both 1991 and 1998 a majority of
managers (58 percent in 1991, 51.3 percent in 1998) indicated strong support
13 for the
proposition that job security made them careful in screening job seekers. In both years a
majority (56.7 percent in 1991, 54.5 percent in 1998) also indicated strong support for
the proposition that job security lowered their propensity to hire people in an economic
upturn, and increased the propensity to rely on overtime hours. In 1998 a substantial
minority (36.4 percent) indicated strong support for the proposition that the seniority
principle inhibited layoffs in recessions, because firms otherwise faced the risk of having
to layoff competent, recently employed, workers. We interpret this as fairly robust
evidence that recent theories about employment dynamics and job security have validity.
In Sweden, as in many other countries with stringent laws, there are flexible
arrangements open for a firm that wants to avoid a permanent employment contract, like
trial employment, and hirings from temporary work agencies. In table 1 we show the
responses when we asked how job security for permanent employees affects firms’
                                                       
11 For theory and evidence suggesting that job protection has little effect on average employment, but a
stronger effect on employment composition, see e.g. Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bertola (1990), and
Nickell and Layard (1997). For an alternative view, see Lazear (1990).
12 According to the OECD employment protection index, Sweden belongs in a group of countries with
tough regulations. In addition to requiring severance pay and advance notification, Swedish law requires
that layoffs must follow a strict seniority principle.10
demand for flexible contracts. A far greater share of managers replied that job security
boosted the use of temporary contracts in 1998 than in 1991. This is consistent with the
fact that the number of employees on temporary contracts rose substantially during the
1990s. It also fits with the view that a more unstable environment increases firms’
demand for flexibility; see e.g. Blanchard et al. (1986).
5. Work morale and the business cycle
Previous field surveys of wage rigidity have found much support for efficiency wage
mechanisms, broadly interpreted. An implication common to all efficiency wage models
is that outside opportunities affect effort on the job. In 1991 a great number of managers
accepted this contention. Ninety percent thought that an increase in the local
unemployment rate would stimulate work effort, and about 60 percent believed that the
same thing would happen if unemployment benefits were to be lowered.
If these prior beliefs of managers make sense, their employees ought to work
harder in 1998 than in 1991, when unemployment was much lower. This is precisely
what we find. In both years we asked “How common is it for your employees to provide
less effort than expected, i.e. to shirk?”. In 1991 most managers did not regard sub-
standard performance as very common. But when we asked the same question in 1998
51.6 percent of managers reported that sub-standard performance had got less common,
34.2 percent reported that it was as common as before, while 14.2 percent reported that
                                                                                                                                                                  
13 By “strong” we mean that a respondent answers with a numerical score of at least seven on our integer
scale from 1 to 9.11
it had got more common.
14 Figure 1 indicates a strong business cycle effect on work
morale, as perceived by managers.
This response is compatible with both a fair wage and a shirking interpretation of
the efficiency wage model. According to the fair wage model, higher unemployment
stimulates effort since workers become more “grateful” to be employed (Akerlof (1982)).
According to the shirking model, higher unemployment increases effort, as it raises the
economic penalty of being caught as a shirker (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)). The positive
relation between effort and unemployment is also consistent with the conjecture that firms
exploit recessions to get rid of their least productive employees.
15
A noteworthy finding of previous field surveys is that all report strong support
for theories that emphasize fairness and morale as important factors in explaining effort
and wage rigidity.
16 There is also reasonably strong support for models based on
turnover costs, and – to some extent – adverse selection mechanisms. However, there is
very little support for the shirking model, the model that has attracted most attention in
the literature.
17 Managers do not appear to view punishment threats as good motivators.
In 1991 our managers replied that employees who were repeatedly caught shirking were
punished by a simple verbal rebuke, and that penalties with an economic content were
                                                       
14 A t-test reveals that the change in the average score between 1998 and 1991 is statistically significant.
15 However, this presupposes that firms somehow find a way to circumvent the seniority provisions of
Swedish job security legislation.
16 Blinder and Choi (1990), Bewley (1998), and Campbell and Kamlani (1997) report evidence
suggesting that that there is a strong negative relationship between work morale and wage cuts, while
they find a much weaker link between work morale and wage levels. Our questions on the relation
between effort and wages did not distinguish between wage levels and wage cuts. We simply asked about
the probability that employees reduced effort if the firm upheld a wage structure that was considered to
be “unfair”, without specifying whether this was because wages had been cut, or because the level of
wages had grown at a relatively low rate. With this formulation of the question, the answers we received
were less clear cut. While most firms acknowledged that an unfair wage structure might lead to reduced
effort, few firms replied that the relationship was a very strong one. This pattern applies in both 1991
and 1998.12
very rare. If the Shapiro-Stiglitz model really is correct in portraying workers as deriving
utility from shirking, such lax penalties ought to be accompanied by incentive problems
on a massive scale, no matter the extent of monitoring.
In 1998 we borrowed a question from Campbell and Kamlani (1997), and asked
managers to assess the importance of four factors in boosting the effort of their
employees: close supervision, high wages, good management-worker relationships, and
high unemployment. Table 2 reports the percentage of managers that rank each of the
factors as the most important one, and a comparison with the results for the US
managers surveyed by Campbell and Kamlani. In both surveys the not-so-neoclassical
sounding ”good management-worker relationships” comes out much ahead. Managers in
both countries also appear to assign the least weight to close supervision, a factor
emphasized in the shirking literature.
18 But Swedish managers appear to attribute a much
less important motivating role to high wages. It seems likely that this reflects the much
higher unionization rates in Sweden, and the less individualistic nature of industrial
relations and wage bargaining. Swedish managers have probably less discretion than US
ones in designing incentive compatible wage hierarchies.
In field surveys, semantics is important, as are framing effects. To reduce the risk
that the choice between ”good relationships” and ”close supervision” is biased by the fact
that the former sounds so much nicer, our 1998 survey asked managers to list, in their
own words, the factors that they judged to be most important in motivating their
employees. Although some stressed the importance of incentives, in the form of
                                                                                                                                                                  
17 However, as noted by Malcolmson (1998), all field surveys have targeted their questions specifically at
the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, where there is a very simple relation between effort, wages, and
unemployment. There are more elaborate shirking models, on which these surveys have no bearing.
18 In our Swedish survey 61 percent of managers indicated that close supervision was the least important
factor among the four.13
productivity-related pay, and career tracks, most managers emphasized other incentive
devices. They answered that their employees ought to be given stimulating work
assignments, and to feel involved in decision-making. They answered that it was
important that all employees felt noticed and trusted, and provided with continuous
feedback and appreciation. Some managers pointed to the benefits from creating a
friendly atmosphere, and one answered that people work hard as long as they have fun.
It is interesting to note that these responses are practically identical to those
given by the US managers interviewed by Bewley (1998). Both Swedish and US
managers seem to ascribe a more important motivational role to psychological and
sociological factors than to the factors that are stressed in neoclassical economics. Thus,
work morale depends on much more than management’s ability to impose sanctions and
measure out economic prizes.
6. The nominal wage floor
Our stylized facts indicate that nominal wage cuts are highly rare. To probe deeper we
asked managers a number of questions on the nature and sources of rigid money wages.
We were interested to learn how managers assessed their employees’ resistance to wage
cuts. For this purpose we asked the following:
Assume that the management in the midst of an acute crisis suggests an identical
percentage wage cut for all employees in your firm, so that the wage hierarchy is
retained. What share of the jobs do you believe must be at stake if the proposed
cut is to be accepted?14
It goes without saying that it might be difficult to come up with a very well-informed
answer to this hypothetical question.
19 It seems reasonable to conjecture that many
managers provided us with their gut reactions, rather than a reasoned response. Even so,
a gut reaction can be quite revealing.
The responses shown in table 3 suggest that subjectively perceived wage rigidity
is intense and prevalent. In both 1991 and 1998 a large majority of managers believed
that a proposal to cut pay to safe jobs would be strongly resisted. In both years an
overwhelming majority of managers thought that more than 50 percent of the jobs must
be at risk if their employees are to accept a proposal to cut pay. These responses can be
contrasted to the natural idea, put forth in the union literature, that wage reductions
occur when the job of the median employee is at risk; i.e. a shock that threatens the jobs
of exactly 50 percent of the workforce would be enough to make the local union accept
a pay cut.
There are many ways of rationalizing downward rigidity of money wages. In our
view three types of argument have particular appeal in the Swedish context: (i) the legal
and bargaining framework that surrounds the wage contract; (ii) reservation wages and
the level and generosity of welfare state institutions; (iii) employees’ concerns over
relative wages. Let us discuss each argument in turn.
Legal and bargaining framework. A basic observation is that Swedish employers are not
allowed to unilaterally reduce nominal wages. This stipulation applies also in a situation
when the old wage contract has expired; the terms of the old contract prevail until the
                                                       
19 Indeed, a few managers complained that they judged the question to be too speculative. But the great
majority of them still responded – 153 in 1991, and 151 in 1998.15
parties have reached a new agreement.
20 But even if a local union agrees to accept a new
wage contract which prescribes reduced pay, it is not obvious that the new contract can
be implemented. The consent from the local union is a necessary, but not sufficient,
requirement for a pay cut.
First, for employees covered by collective union contracts, the union contract is
included in the individual wage contract. Even if a local union agrees to reduce the
money wage specified in the union contract, individual union members must give their
consent to change the individual contract before the wage cut can be expedited. Second,
many employees have their wages set in a two-tier bargaining system, where industry
level negotiations precede local level negotiations. The (minimum) wage levels specified
in the industry level agreement defines a floor, which must not be undercut by the local
wage agreement. This reduces the scope for local level pay cuts.
Net replacement rates and resistance to wage cuts. As discussed in Section 3, the
combination of unemployment insurance and various income dependent taxes and social
benefits implies that the net income reduction from job loss is relatively modest for many
Swedes. Because of the social insurance provided by the welfare state, one may
reasonably expect that employees become more prone to resist proposals to cut pay.
Because the net replacement rate in case of job loss is higher for blue collar workers than
for white collar workers,
21 one may also expect that resistance to pay cuts is stronger in
firms with a greater share of blue collar workers.
                                                       
20 See Holden (1994) for a theoretical analysis of how this property of the wage contract (“holdout”) can
lead to nominal wage rigidity.
21 More generally, people with higher incomes have lower replacement rates than people with lower
incomes. In 1991, when we conducted our first survey, the Swedish unemployment compensation system
prescribed that an unemployed person was to be provided with a compensation rate of 90 percent (later16
This pattern is indeed what we find in our data. In our 1991 survey, consisting of
179 responding firms, we have background information about firms’ employment
structure. We divide these 179 firms in two groups, according to the resistance to pay
cuts, as perceived by managers. We assign the number 1 to firms where wage cut
resistance is very high (in the sense that wage cuts will never be accepted, or acceptable
in case of a shock which threatens all jobs), and the number 0 to the other firms, where
wage cut resistance is more moderate. We then estimate probit models for the probability
that firms belong to the group where wage cut resistance is very high.
In the estimated equations firms’ share of white collar workers have the expected
negative sign (see Table A1 in the appendix). On average, managers in firms with a large
share of white collar workers are more confident that their employees would accept a
proposal to cut pay to avoid major redundancies. The white collar variable remains
negatively significant when we add a set of industry dummy variables, and measures of
firm size, and the overall wage level of the firm, to the regression. As white collar
workers are less unionized than blue collar workers, and because unionization might
have an independent effect on wage cut resistance, we also run regressions where we
include the unionization rate among the explanatory variables. The white collar variable
remains negative, but the significance level drops somewhat (the unionization variable
has a positive, but far from significant, effect).
This evidence is clearly of an indirect nature, and there are probably alternative
ways of rationalizing a negative partial correlation between wage cut resistance and the
share of white collar workers. Our regressions do suggest, however, that there is no easy
                                                                                                                                                                  
to be lowered to 80 percent) of previous earnings up to a maximum amount. This cap on benefits is of no
importance for blue collar workers, but implies that many white collar workers will have lower (or much
lower) effective compensation rates in times of job loss.17
way of dismissing the natural idea that the safety net of the welfare state contributes to
the downward rigidity of money wages. It seems appropriate to conclude this discussion
with the customary call for future research.
Employees’ concerns over relative wages. A classic explanation for nominal wage
rigidity is the argument of Keynes that workers care about relative wages. Because of
this they oppose money wage cuts, unless wages can be cut everywhere in the economy,
so as to maintain wage relativities. But if such interpersonal comparisons are to explain
more than a trivial amount of rigidity, they should reasonably extend beyond workers in
the same firm. Surveys among US managers suggest, however, that employees mainly
care about the wage structure within firms. Campbell and Kamlani (1997, p. 780) found
that notions of fair pay depend on workers’ own past wages, firm’s profits, and wages of
other workers in the same firm. Bewley (1998, p. 485) argues that Keynes’s relative
wage theory is off the mark, since workers in the firms he approached had ”…little
systematic knowledge of pay rates at other firms.”
Our Swedish evidence, in contrast, indicates that employees pay great attention
to the wage distribution within and across firms. In 1991 there was much consensus
among managers that employees care about external wage relativities, see table 4. Blue
collar workers compared wages both within and across establishments, while white-
collar workers in general, and management in particular, put a relatively greater emphasis
on the inter-firm wage structure.
22 In 1998 we found that inter-firm wage comparisons
                                                       
22 Our result that employees frequently point at external wage relativities in local wage bargaining is not
in itself a strong indication of any particular model of the labor market. In principle, it is even consistent
with the competitive model. In the absence of a Walrasian auctioneer the way to infer the going market
wage is to look at wages payable in neighbouring firms before quitting a firm that pays a non-
competitive wage. We would then expect relative wage comparisons to be more important in low-wage18
have got significantly more common among white collar workers, and marginally less
common among blue collar workers. Thus, to the extent that wage rigidity is due to
relative wage comparisons, there is no ground to conclude that it has got less
pronounced during Sweden’s move from a low unemployment/high inflation equilibrium,
to one with high unemployment/low inflation. Further support for this conclusion is
provided by the responses we obtained when we directly asked managers about the
plausibility of Keynes’s theory of nominal wage rigidity; see table 5. In 1991 managers’
support was lukewarm – in 1998 it had increased substantially.
23
What can explain the greater role of inter-firm wage comparisons in Swedish field
surveys? No doubt, institutions play a role. Union coverage is very high in our firms,
ranging from 60 to 100 percent, while Bewley (1998) and Campbell and Kamlani (1997)
interview managers in firms with little or no union coverage. Since unions can be
expected to disseminate information about pay and pay scales across firms, and across
industries, this is likely to make a difference. Bewley (1998, p. 485) describes the non-
union firms that he interviewed as “isolated islands,” where workers know little about
pay in other locations. In Sweden, local unions have ample access to data on wage
structure and wage changes throughout the country.
                                                                                                                                                                  
firms than in high-wage firms. This does not fit the facts, however. Relative wage comparisons seem
equally important in all firms. Another finding is that employees’ standard of comparison seems to
extend well beyond other groups of employees. The percentage of firms that reported that it was
”common” or ”very common” that employees or local unions pushed for higher wages or salaries in
times of high company profits increased from 36.7 percent in 1991 to 46.1 percent in 1998.
23 It is tempting to speculate that the increased support for Keynes's relative wage theory is due to the
fact that inflation had been low for several consecutive years when we asked the question in 1998. When
we asked about the theory in 1991 price and wage inflation had been high for a number of years, and
many managers might not have found the question very relevant. However, the comparison is
complicated by the fact that the questions differed somewhat between years. The question on the top of
table 5, emphasizing the role of inter-firm wage relativities, is the one we used in 1998. The question
that we used in 1991, taken from Blinder and Choi (1990, p. 1006), stressed the role of wage relativities
more generally.19
From this perspective one may well argue that Keynes’s relative wage theory of
nominal wage rigidity is more suited for the unionized European economies, than for the
USA, where the union sector is much smaller. In this context, it is also of some interest
to note that Keynes’s own thoughts on nominal wage rigidity appear to be based on the
experience of the U.K. in the 1920s,
24 when unions played a much more important role
than has ever been the case in the USA.
*
In the informed policy debate, the legal details of the wage contract, the generosity of the
welfare system, and considerations of fairness and relative income, have all been pointed
at as potentially important determinants of downward money wage rigidity. Taken
separately, each of these factors may explain a nontrivial amount of rigidity. When
combined, a nominal wage floor of exceptional endurance appears to materialize. From
this perspective, the documented absence of nominal pay cuts during the Swedish
macroeconomic bust should come as no surprise.
As first noted by Tobin (1972) the existence of a nominal wage floor implies that
real wages will become more rigid as the inflation rate goes to zero. For this reason,
some inflation might be needed to grease the wheels of the labor market. In view of the
Riksbank’s demonstrated ability in achieving price stability, this raises some disturbing
questions about the Swedish labor market’s ability to cope with future, as yet
unforeseen, macroeconomic shocks.
                                                       
24 Keynes’s relative wage explanation for nominal wage rigidity is often traced to The general theory
(1936, p. 14). But Keynes (1925) is an earlier publication, which discusses British coal-miners’
resistance to wage cuts in terms of fairness and relative income.20
7. Signals of unobservable productivity and the stigma of unemployment
Much modern theorizing about the labor market starts with the assumption that
information is asymmetric. To shed light on the relevance of these theories we asked
managers a number of questions that were designed to shed light on to what extent they
looked out for various signals of unobservable productivity when they make hiring
decisions. We were also interested to see whether the appearance of very high
unemployment had altered managers’ perceptions of these signals.
According to the adverse selection model firms may offer wages that are above
the market clearing ones because they want to attract a superior pool of job applicants.
To see whether managers interpret a high wage claim as a signal of high productivity, we
asked the same question as Blinder and Choi (1990):
Assume that two persons are competing for the same job. From interviews,
experiences, education, etc., both seem equally qualified. One of the two accepts
the wage offered by the firm, while the other demands a higher wage. Would you
consider the latter, who demands a higher wage, to be potentially more
productive?
As can be seen in table 6 few managers indicated strong support for the idea that a high
wage claim can be interpreted as a signal of high productivity.
25 The responses we got
when we asked managers about their attitudes to underbidders in other parts of our
survey suggest the existence of asymmetric reputation effects. While many managers
appear to interpret an offer to work for less than the going wage as a signal of low
productivity, they appear to pay little attention to high wage signals.
                                                       
25 Still, in both 1991 and 1998 the most common response was a “5” on our integer scale. This can be
contrasted to the findings of Blinder and Choi (1990), who report that not one of their respondents
answered the question in the affirmative.21
Another possibility, much discussed in the context of European unemployment, is
that firms may view job-seekers with a history of unemployment as less productive. This
is also one of the mechanisms that may generate unemployment persistence in the wake
of an adverse macroeconomic shock. To examine whether the long-term unemployed are
subject to statistical discrimination, we asked
Assume that two persons are competing for the same job. From interviews,
experiences, education, etc., both seem equally qualified. However, one of the
two is unemployed, and has been so for a longer period. Would you consider this
person to be potentially less productive?
From table 7 we can see that the stigma of unemployment appears to be more severe in
1998 than in 1991. The percentage of managers that view long-term unemployment as a
strong signal of low productivity increases from 21 percent in 1991 to 27 percent in
1998.
26 This finding runs counter to the intuitive argument that the scars from
unemployment ought to be less severe in a situation when it is shared among the many.
Active labor market policy has for long been Sweden’s main strategy for
combating unemployment, and the extreme crisis of the 1990s is no exception. During
the 1990s between four and five percent of the work force has been enrolled in various
labor market programs. In view of the large volumes involved, many economists have
cautioned that these programs are subject to inefficiencies. In our 1998 survey we asked
managers questions designed to capture reputation effects from participation in labor
market training, or measures like relief work and work life development (which are
specific to the active Swedish labor market policy). Table 7 shows that a number of
                                                       
26 However, a t-test reveals that the increase in the mean score from 4.62 to 4.93 is not statistically
significant at conventional levels.22
managers appear to view participation in labor market programs as a strong signal of low
productivity. But the results still suggest that an unemployed person is well advised to
join a program – unemployment seems to be associated with a stronger stigma than
either labor market training or relief work/work life development.
27
                                                       
27 It is only the difference in the mean score between unemployment (according to the 1998 survey) and
labor market training that passes a t-test for statistical significance.23
8. Conclusions
This paper reports the results from a repeat survey among managers in Swedish
manufacturing, designed to explore how a severe and prolonged macroeconomic shock
affects wage rigidity and unemployment. Our second survey was conducted in 1998,
when the unemployment rate was much higher, and the inflation rate much lower, than
when we conducted the first survey in 1991. Subject to the usual caveat that survey
evidence must be interpreted with caution, we believe that our study casts new light on a
number of important issues.
We find no evidence that the increase in unemployment has softened the
mechanisms generating wage rigidity. In 1998 employees seem as determined to resist
wage cuts as in 1991, even at the cost of additional – and substantial – job losses.
Another surprising finding is that underbidding and active wage competition from the
unemployed appear to have got less intense when they were most needed, i.e. during the
macroeconomic bust. We attribute this to a discouragement effect from high lay-off rates
and low vacancy rates.
An important part of our study focuses on the scope for nominal wage cuts. We
document the virtual absence of nominal wage cuts in an environment characterized by
very low – or zero – inflation. The downward stickiness of money wages appears to
depend on a number of interacting factors, including institutional aspects of the wage
contract, and the two-tier Swedish bargaining system. In addition, we find support for
the old idea of Keynes that employees’ concerns about relative wages and fairness
strengthen nominal rigidity. We also report some indirect – but far from decisive –
evidence, consistent with the idea that the safety net provided by the welfare state
reinforces nominal rigidity. Taken separately, each of these factors may explain a24
nontrivial amount of nominal wage rigidity. When combined, a nominal wage floor of
exceptional endurance appears to materialize. The existence of a nominal wage floor also
implies that real wages become more rigid as the inflation rate goes to zero. In view of
the Riksbank’s apparent ability in achieving price stability, this raises some disturbing
questions about the Swedish labor market’s ability to cope with future, as yet
unforeseen, macroeconomic shocks.
We also present new evidence about mechanisms capable of explaining
unemployment persistence (i.e. why unemployment appears to return to normal at such a
slow pace in the years following an adverse macroeconomic shock). We examine to what
extent employers view job-seekers with an history of long-term unemployment as
potentially less productive, and find that a sizable minority of our respondents view long-
term unemployment as a strong negative productivity signal. In addition, our respondents
point at the stringent Swedish job security legislation as an important factor that limits
new hires during an economic upturn. Both these mechanisms – scars from
unemployment and job security – may certainly go some way towards explaining the
weak recovery of labor demand after the initial macroeconomic bust.
Finally, we discuss a range of evidence concerning effort and motivation. We
present substantial evidence that unemployment raises effort and eliminates substandard
performance, an implication common to many efficiency wage models. We conclude that
much recent theorizing about effort and incentives is potentially misplaced. Most
managers appear to ascribe a more important motivational role to psychological and
sociological factors than to economic sticks and carrots.25
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Table 1. ”Indicate to what extent you agree with the following proposition: Job security
legislation makes your firm more prone to offer flexible short-term employment
contracts (e.g. contracts based on trial employment)”
Average score Percentage of managers
indicating strong support
for the proposition
1991 sample 4.94 33.76
1998 sample 6.11 57.69
Note: The scores are given on an integer scale 1-9, where 1 stands for ”no support”, and
9 for ”very strong support”. In the third column we show the percentage of
managers responding with a numerical score of at least seven.29
Table 2. Percentage of managers in Sweden and the USA that rank each of the factors
below as the most important one in motivating their employees.
Factor Percentage of managers that rank the factor as most
important in motivating their employees
Our 1998 survey of
Swedish managers
Campbell and Kamlani
survey of US managers
Close supervision of
work effort
  3.24   6.13




High unemployment   9.19 10.75
Note: The numbers in the third column are adapted from C-K (1997, p. 775) as follows.
First, while C-K report results for three types of employees, we just compute the
average. Second, C-K include a fifth factor in their comparison, ”good working
conditions”, which we eliminate. We re-scale the percentages reported by C-K
for the other factors accordingly.30
Table 3. “Assume that the management in the midst of an acute crisis suggests an
identical percentage wage cut for all employees in the firm, so that the wage
hierarchy is retained. What share of the jobs do you believe must be at stake if
the proposed cut is to be accepted by employees.”






% 50 £   20.26   13.91
% 100 ... 50 < <   49.67   56.95
100 % (closing down)   22.22   19.21
Not even a threat of
closing down is enough
    7.84     9.93
Total 100.0 100.031
Table 4. ”How common is it for your employees (directly or via local union
representative) to compare their wage with wages of employees in other firms in
wage negotiations?”
Average score Percentage of managers
that identify inter-firm wage














Note: The scores are given on an integer scale 1-9, where 1 stands for ”very
uncommon”, and 9 for ”very common”. In the third column we show the
percentage of managers responding with a numerical score of at least seven.32
Table 5. ”According to some academic researchers the reason that nominal wages
seldom fall is that wage relativities might be altered. Employees protect their
position in the wage hierarchy, and they resist a wage cut because they are
afraid that they will fall behind employees in other firms. How important is this
explanation for the fact that nominal wages seldom fall?”
Average score Percentage of managers
that consider the theory as
important or very important
1991 sample 4.81 24.03
1998 sample 5.65 41.18
Note: The scores are given on an integer scale 1-9, where 1 stands for ”unimportant”,
and 9 for ”very important”. In the third column we show the percentage of
managers responding with a numerical score of at least seven.33
Table 6. ”Assume that two persons are competing for the same job. From interviews,
experiences, education, etc., both seem equally qualified. One of the two accepts
the wage offered by the firm, while the other demands a higher wage. Would you
consider the latter, who demands a higher wage, to be potentially more
productive?”
Average score Percentage of managers
that views a high wage
claim as strong positive
productivity signal
1991 sample 3.61 4.52
1998 sample 3.72 5.33
Note: The scores are given on an integer scale 1-9, where 1 stands for ”never”, and 9 for
”always”. In the third column we show the percentage of managers responding
with a numerical score of at least seven.34
Table 7. ”Assume that two persons are competing for the same job. From interviews,
experiences, education, etc., both seem equally qualified. However, one of the
two is (unemployed OR enrolled in labor market training OR subject to
measures like relief work/work life development) and has been so for a longer
period. Would you consider this person to be potentially less productive?”
Average score Percentage of managers
that view the activity in















Notes: The scores are given on an integer scale 1-9, where 1 stands for ”never”, and 9
for ”always”. In the third column we show the percentage of managers
responding with a numerical score of at least seven.35













2 3 4 5
some-
times
6 7 8 9
always
Fraction 1998 199136
Table A1. Maximum likelihood estimates of binary probit models for subjectively
perceived wage cut resistance (Standard errors in parentheses. An asterisk denotes
significance at the 5 percent level)





































  51   51   51   46   46
No. of firms 174 174 172 156 158
Notes: The dependent variable is described in the main text. White collar share is the
share of the firm’s workforce that the manager classifies as white collar workers,
Size is the total number of employees in the firm, Overall wage level is a self-
reported measure of how the manager assesses firm’s wage level compared to
other firms in the same industry, Unionization rate is the share of a firm’s
employees that are union members. All regressions in columns 1-5 include a set
of industry dummy variables (not shown). Because of missing values, the number
of observations differ across specifications.